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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel approach to do online analysis
of accidental fault localization for dynamic systems by us-
ing Hidden Markov Model (HMM). By introducing reason-
able and appropriate abstraction of complex system, HMM is
used to represent the fault and no-fault states of system’s com-
ponents and system’s behaviour. The HMM is parametrized
to be statistically equivalent to real system’s behaviour. In-
spired by the principles of Fault Tree Analysis and maximum
entropy in Bayesian probability theory, we propose the algo-
rithms to estimate HMM’s parameters, instead of learning,
because in real systems the learning data for accidental fault
is difficult to obtain. We design a specific test bed to gener-
ate large quantity of test cases, and give out the experimental
results to assess the accuracy and efficiency. Meanwhile, we
apply the approach to a simple helicopter control system case
study, and give out convincing results.
1. INTRODUCTION
Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) is dedicated to moni-
toring a system, identifying when a fault has occurred, and
pinpointing the type of fault and its location. One main FDI
approach derives the faults from some model, classified into
the category Model-Based FDI, while another main category
is Signal Processing based FDI. In model-based FDI, the sys-
tem model may be mathematical, or knowledge based, in-
cluding observer-based approach, parity-space approach, pa-
rameter identification based methods, etc [1]. As the dynamic
systems’ complexity increases, the resource-consuming sim-
ulation technology is insufficient for detecting faults in sys-
tems. Thus, it becomes urgent to use abstract model to rep-
resent complex system by keeping necessary and sufficient
information. The efficiency and accuracy of model-based ap-
proach depends on the appropriate abstraction and reasonable
assumptions.
Many theories and techniques exist for the analysis and
simulation of large dynamic systems. Our previous work [2]
proposes a co-analysis framework for the automated analysis
of cyber-physical systems (CPS) [3], in which the behaviour
of Simulink is taken in an as-is manner determined by the
simulation algorithms. The approach combines logic-based
formal analysis methods with numerical simulations to enable
the analysis of an under-constrained controller design, which
cannot be handled by co-simulation. An open question pro-
posed by the perspective in [2] concerns the fault detection
and localization in systems. CPS introduce a new paradigm
to software-intensive systems, in which the controller (sys-
tem) is strongly affected by feedback from the plant (envi-
ronment). As shown in Fig. 1, a controller may have several
control modes and changes itself with transitions between the
modes. Since some of the Simulink model descriptions rep-
resent hardware components, the controller is expected to be
able to do online analysis of the accidental fault localization
F (t) occurring in the hardware.
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Figure 1. Cyber-Physical System with Control Modes
In this paper, we aim to solve the above problem by us-
ing a statistical model, Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [4]. In
HMM, the system being modeled is assumed to be a Markov
process with unobserved (hidden) states. By analysing the ob-
served outputs of the hidden states, system’s behaviour can be
deduced. HMM has thus been widely used in temporal pat-
tern recognition such as speech, handwriting, gesture recog-
nition, etc. HMM has been used to diagnose and prognose
the whole system’s health condition in some existing works
[5] [6]. The learning tasks are used to train the parameters in
HMM. However, the learning task is based on rich observed
sequences with enough fault experience, which is not easy
to obtain for accidental faults. In this work, we propose a
novel approach to use HMM to do online analysis of acci-
dental fault localization in dynamic systems. We introduce
appropriate abstraction of complex dynamic systems and rea-
sonable assumptions of HMM parameters, to represent the
fault and no-fault states of system’s components and system’s
behaviour. Inspired by the principles of Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) [7] and of maximum entropy [8] in Bayesian probabil-
ity theory, we propose an algorithm to estimate the parameters
in HMM without learning task. We evaluate the accuracy and
efficiency of proposed algorithm by using a specific test bed
to generate 1000 test cases, and then apply the approach to a
simple helicopter control system case study.
In paper [9], the author aims to prove the validation of
CPS’s behavioural properties by statistical model. Our main
ideas are identical: using statistical model to deduce the con-
clusion, except that [9] introduces a formal description in
BLTL (Bounded Linear Temporal Logic), instead of HMM,
to interpret the probable result sequence, which is the same
concept as our observation sequence. By using importance-
sampling and cross-entropy (two classic statistical methods),
the main obstacle [9] encounters is that it needs much more
samples to give out a convincing conclusion. The reason be-
hind is that BLTL treats each element in a result sequence
in a pure statistical thus relatively independent way, while
HMM assumes that there must be some explicit dependency
between the elements.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2. details the
problem we aim to solve; Section 3. gives an overview of our
approach by introducing HMM modeling and analysis meth-
ods; Section 4. presents the approach of online analysing ac-
cidental fault localization for complex dynamic systems by
using HMM; Section 5. experiments the approach in a spe-
cific test bed; applies the approach to a simple helicopter con-
trol system case study; and discusses the generalization of the
approach; Section 6. gives some concluding and perspective
remarks.
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The accidental fault may occur on the hardware during sys-
tem’s execution. Since the accidental fault does not frequently
occurs, a reasonable assumption is made in this work.
Assumption 1. A system encounters accidental fault means
at this moment, at most one device is the fault source. Two
devices cannot encounter accidental fault at the same time.
The prior knowledge in this work consists of devices’ de-
fault parameters and system’s specification. The device’s de-
fault parameters indicate a device’s fault occurrence proba-
bility. This parameter is usually provided by the device man-
ufacture according to the testing result before selling. Alter-
natively, MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) can be used
to deduce this parameter if information is lacking. System’s
specification describes the expected functional constraints.
Example 1 (Problem Description Example). During a fi-
nite simulation period T , we choose N observation time
points for the system with components A, B, C, D, etc (Fig.
2). Assume M functional constraints (FC) are described in
the specification. vi(i = 1...11) are output/input variables be-
tween the components.
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Figure 2. Problem Description Example
After time T , we obtain the violation status (R for respect-
ing specification, V for violating specification) for the M
functional constraints at time points t (t = 1...N), i.e.
FCt1(v1,v3,v5) =V
...
FCtM(v2) = R
When a functional constraint is violated, one of the de-
vices must have encountered an accidental fault. However
once we detect a wrong output from a device, usually the
others’ outputs will be bad due to failure propagation. Thus
the problem is distinguishing and locating accidental fault’s
source device. This can be considered as a pattern recognition
question. Moreover, the accidental fault localization approach
should support online analysis, which implies that the method
needs to be computation-economic and easy to implemented
by most onboard dynamic systems.
The simulation technology is able to provide analysable
evidence to help fault identification. Nevertheless, it lacks the
mechanism to automatically locate the accidental fault. We
introduce HMM in this work, because HMM, a good com-
promise between Bayesian network and time-based sequence,
disposes of a natural capacity to deal with time-related pattern
recognition problems. As shown in Fig. 3, HMM can be used
to diagnostics, prognostics and online analysis.
!"#$#%& '(&("#!)$&
*+),%-$&+.$
!"-,%-$&+.$
/%0+%#12%)03$+$
Figure 3. HMM Diagnostics and Prognostics
On the other hand, HMM, as the abstraction of real sys-
tem, simulates statistically system’s inner states and their be-
haviours. Once HMM is trained or built, it can be used to di-
agnose system’s past and current health condition and prog-
noses future condition. Some works are aimed to detect the
whole system’s health condition, while in this work we aim
to go further, to locate the fault source in the system.
3. HMM MODELING AND ANALYSIS
An HMM is defined as a statistical model used to repre-
sent stochastic processes, where the states are not directly ob-
served. A basic HMM can be described as follows:
• N: number of states
• M: number of observations
• MI: initial probability distribution;
N
∑
i=1
MI(i) = 1
• MT: probability distribution of transitions from states to
states;
N
∑
j=1
MT(i, j) = 1, i = 1...N
• ME: emission distribution for the observations associ-
ated with states;
M
∑
j=1
ME(i, j) = 1, i = 1...N
Example 2 (HMM Example). A two states HMM exam-
ple abstracting a system’s health condition is given by Fig.
4, where the system owns two states Healthy and Faulty,
and two observations which represent whether the ouputs
respect the functional constraints (R) or violate the func-
tional constraints (V ). The three distributions MIMTME are:(
0.6 0.4
)(0.7 0.3
0.4 0.6
)(
0.9 0.1
0.2 0.8
)
.
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Figure 4. A Two States Hidden Markov Model
HMM, as abstract model of real system, is statistically
identical to system’s real behaviour. When modeling a sys-
tem, HMM separates the concept into two conceptually in-
dependent paradigms: behaviour and observation. Behaviour
refers to what the system really is; while observation to what
the system exhibits that is used for its recognition. MI gives
indication about the probability that a behaviour becomes the
first behaviour when system runs. MT decides how probably
will the system behave from one state to the other states. This
is statistically equivalent to the real system’s behaviour. ME
provides a distribution that connects the behaviour and the
observation: if at a given time the behaviour is known, how
probably an observed sequence will occur.
MI,MT and ME can be obtained by modelling or through
a learning process. Once all these matrix parameters are esti-
mated, HMM is capable to deduce, given an observed output
sequence or a set of such sequences, the maximum likelihood
estimation of inner-state transition sequences. The work [5]
shows a traditional way of applying HMM to system diagno-
sis and prognosis, as shown in Fig. 5. The trained HMM will
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Figure 5. Traditional HMM Approach
be used to estimate system’s past condition, predict system’s
future condition and compute a future observed sequence’s
occurrence probability.
In Ex. 2, we can observe an output sequence Seq(t) from
the observers Output R and Output V within a certain obser-
vation time T , e.g.
(
V V V V R V V V
)
.
As the parameters are pre-defined, we can derive sys-
tem’s behaviour State(t) during T by using Viterbi algorithm
[10], in which H means healthy, and F means faulty, i.e.(
F F F F H F F F
)
.
In this work, our objective is to find out how system per-
forms in terms of behaviour, however, the only available in-
formation source for the external world is the observation.
Therefore a backward analysis is necessary to recover the be-
haviour from the observation. As we aim to tell the exact lo-
cation of the fault, not only detecting unhealthy condition of a
system, the core issue is how to construct HMM representing
a system with probable fault.
The learning task cannot be used in this work. Because the
accidental fault does not frequently happen, thus the learning
task cannot be trained with rich fault experience. The model-
ing method in our research allows to pre-define some HMM
parameters by using prior knowledge of devices’ fault occur-
rence probability.
4. ONLINE ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTAL
FAULT LOCALIZATION
The approach takes all the components in a system as a
whole model. When modeling HMM, a hidden state repre-
sents, at this moment, on which components one accidental
fault occurs, or not. Instead of using learning task to train
the parameters in HMM, we define the specific states and ob-
servations dedicated to accidental fault localization, and pro-
pose our own algorithms to compute the HMM’s parameters
by analysing system’s architecture and using devices’ fault
occurrence probability. The proposed algorithms have been
evaluated in the experiments by using our test bed and real
case study, which will be presented in the next part.
Definition 1 (Physical Variable). A component C in a system
has NI inputs and NO outputs variables, which connect C with
other components. These NI together with NO variables are
the physical variables of C.
By running the system, for some physical variables,
whether it violates or not the functional constraints will be
known. If it is possible to observe M physical variables’ value
sequence, the whole system can be modeled by M HMMs.
Each represents whether current system’s behaviour will lead
to one physical variable violating the functional constraints,
and which kind of violation.
4.1. System States
System states represent the health condition of all its com-
ponents. A system with N components is seen as a coupling
entity with N +1 states, each of them represents at the given
moment, which component encounters a certain context that
leads it to give out unwanted output. HMM states are either
all healthy (NF ) or having one faulty component (Fi), mod-
eled as
(
NF F1 F2 ... Fi ... FN
)
.
4.2. Observations & Observed Sequence
The observations represent that physical variables violate
the functional constraints or not.
Definition 2 (Non-Violation (VN)). When a physical vari-
able does not violate functional constraint, this is defined as
non-violation.
Definition 3 (Independent Violation (VI)). When a physical
variable v violates functional constraint with only this vari-
able, i.e. FC(v), this is defined as independent violation.
Definition 4 (Coupling Violation (VC)). When a physical
variable v violates functional constraint with other variables,
i.e. FC′(v,v1,v2, ...), the source of violation cannot be con-
firmed among the variables. The probability of each is thus
given out. It is defined as coupling violation.
Each HMM has these 3 observations: VN , VI and VC . A
system with M physical variables has M HMMs (Fig. 6).
!"#$
%
& &%
&
'
(
%
(
!
(
)
(*+
'
(*+
,
(*+
#
!!!!!!
%
& &%
&
'
(
%
(
!
(
)
!!!
!"#$
Figure 6. System’s HMM Structure
4.3. Initial Probability Distribution MI
The devices’ default occurrence parameters are provided
by the manufacture. A component’s fault parameter can be
estimated when it is well designed, e.g. a functional block
provided by the library of Simulink can be fully trusted, with
fault occurrence parameter 0. For a system with N compo-
nents, let ωi(i = 1...N) be the fault occurrence parameter of
the ith component. MI is thus computed as follows:
MI(0) =
N
∏
i=1
(1−ωi)
N
∏
i=1
(1−ωi)+
N
∑
i=1
ωi
(1)
MI(i) =
ωi
N
∏
i=1
(1−ωi)+
N
∑
i=1
ωi
, i = 1...N (2)
Eqs. 1 and 2 describe the likelihood that no component has
failed at time 0 (i.e., no failure at the start) and the likelihood
that some component i has failed at the start.
If prior knowledge about ωi is unknown, MTBF is used to
deduce the initial parameters. Therefore, the most reasonable
hypothesis is
N
∑
i, j=1
|ωi−ω j|= 0. If some indications exist, like
the ith component is twice more probable to have fault than
the jth, then ωi = 2ω j will replace ωi = ω j.
N
∑
i, j=1
|ωi −ω j|= 0
will be generalized to min(
N
∑
i, j=1
|ωi −ω j|). This can be solved
because
N
∑
i=0
MI(i) = 1.
4.4. Transition Probability Matrix MT
MT(i, j) represents the probability of the transition from
state i to state j. We propose to compute MT by using the
devices’ fault parameters ωi. When the system transits from
current state to all components healthy state, the transition
probability is
N
∏
k=1
(1 − ωk). When the system transits to one
component faulty state j, the probability is ω j
N
∏
k=1,k 6= j
(1−ωk).
After normalization, MT is as follows:
MT(i,0) =
N
∏
k=1
(1−ωk)
N
∏
k=1
(1−ωk)+
N
∑
n=1
(ωn
N
∏
k=1,k 6=n
(1−ωk))
,
i = 0...N
(3)
MT(i, j) =
ω j
N
∏
k=1,k 6= j
(1−ωk)
N
∏
k=1
(1−ωk)+
N
∑
n=1
(ωn
N
∏
k=1,k 6=n
(1−ωk))
,
i = 0...N, j = 1...N
(4)
Eqs. 3 and 4 are the probability from component i failing to
no component failing at a time t > 0 and from component i
failing to component j failing at time t > 0.
4.5. Emission Probability Matrix ME
ME represents, if a component occurs fault, how probably
it will influence the functional constraints. More precisely,
how probably the physical variables will violate the func-
tional constraints. Inspired by the principles of FTA and the
principle of maximum entropy in Bayesian probability the-
ory, we propose the algorithm for computing ME in Fig. 7.
We will explain the definitions and the proposed algorithms
in the following parts.
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Figure 7. ME Algorithm
4.5.1. Computing Influence Graph GI
Definition 5 (Dependency Graph GD). Dependency graph
represents the dependency between system’s components.
Definition 6 (Influence Graph GI). Influence graph is a
graph representing how components’ accidental fault influ-
ences physical variables. Influence graph is topologically
identical to dependency graph, with supplementary influence
weight indicating the probability that the component C in-
fluences the variables vi. The influence weights GI(C,vi) are
computed by using Influence Layout Algorithm.
Example 3 (Influence Graph Example). Fig. 8 is an in-
fluence graph with 9 components and 15 physical variables.
GI(A,v3) is the influence weight between A and v3.
Algorithm 1 (Influence Layout Algorithm). Inspired by the
principles of FTA, we propose this influence layout algorithm.
An influence graph with N components and M variables can
be solved by applying linear programming to Eq. 5-8 .
M
∑
i=1
vi = 1 (5)
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Figure 8. Influence Graph Example
vi >
1
δM
, i = 1...M,δ > 1 (6)
For each component C, the sum of input value equals to
the sum of its output value, to ensure C does not introduce
supplementary side effect to system’s failure analysis (Eq. 7).
∑
in
vi −∑
out
v j = 0 (7)
According to the principle of maximum entropy in Bayesian
probability theory, without any prior knowledge, the differ-
ence between variables should be minimised (Eq. 8).
min
v1...vM
M
∑
i=1
|vi −
1
M
M
∑
j=1
vi| (8)
4.5.2. Computing Influence Distribution DI
Definition 7 (Influence Distribution DI). When component
Ci occurs fault, the influence it has for physical variable v j is
defined as DI(i, j).
The direct way to get DI is the use of simulation. If enough
simulation scenarios covering the range of all the variables
are provided, DI can be exactly constructed with simulation
results. However, the use of simulation is not practical for the
non-frequently happening accidental fault. To make a com-
promise between the computation time and the precision, in-
stead of simulation, we compute DI by using the Influence
Graph. This approach may sacrifice some precision, however,
the experimental results in Sec. 5. will prove its accuracy and
efficiency for the accidental fault problem.
When a component’s output physical variable violates
functional constraints, either because it encounters an acci-
dental fault, or because its dependent components has spread-
able fault. The propagation of fault is related to system’s ar-
chitecture that:
• If Ci has encountered an accidental fault, it will prob-
ably generate an output violation. The reason why it
is not a definitive violation is that in one simulation,
the required-context for violation may not happen. This
probability is defined as DA.
• If Ci depends on C j (Ci directly or indirectly takes C j’s
output as input), and if an accidental fault occurs on C j,
Ci will probably have an output violation. It is not a
definitive violation, because either in one simulation, the
required-context for violation may not happen; or the in-
termediate component’s design has fault-tolerance con-
sideration. This probability is defined as DB.
Algorithm 2 (Influence Distribution Algorithm). As DA
and DB are independent, we have DI = DA +DB. DA and
DB can be computed using GI.
• If variable v j does not depend on component Ci (Ci has
no path to v j), DI(i, j) = 0
• If v j directly depends on Ci, DA(i, j) = GI(Ci,v j)
• If v j indirectly depends on Ci, assume there are P paths
from Ci to v j. Let Oik be the k
th output of Ci, and S(Ci) is
the index of Ci’s successor component on current path.
The recursive computation is as follow:
DB(i, j) =
P
∑
k=1
GI(Ci,Oik) ·DI(S(Ci), j) (9)
Eq. 9 describes system’s fault propagation and fault exposi-
tion. If some faults occur, the most probable faulty component
should be the one that exchanges the most often the data/in-
formation. That’s why there is always an accumulation.
4.5.3. Computing Emission Probability Matrix (ME)
Algorithm 3 (Emission Matrix Algorithm). For the HMM
of variable v, if the state representing Ci is failing, we use the
following algorithm to compute the probability of generating
the observations VI , VC and VN .
For VI , ME should be a function of DI. According to our
test, we found that function y=x is good enough to give out a
relatively accurate result, as shown in Eq. 10.
ME(Ci,VI) = DI(Ci,v) (10)
For VC, if v violates several functional constrains with
other variables (vi), the occurrence time of vi in these con-
straints is ni, and the occurrence time of v is n. The coupling
violation is computed as follows:
ME(Ci,VC) =
nDI(Ci,v)
∑
i
niDI(Ci,vi)
(11)
The emission probability from state to VN is:
ME(Ci,VN) = 1−ME(Ci,VI)−ME(Ci,VC) (12)
Since the only valuable information/entropy in fault localiza-
tion method will become maximized only when a fault hap-
pens, therefore it is difficult (even impossible) to find directly
a statistical distribution for those fault-free behaviour. In this
case, in order to not introduce some new assumption, we
choose to use the HMM’s mathematical property (emission
matrix must be semantically exclusive and the sum should be
1) to present the normal state-observation pair by Eq. 12.
Obviously, the healthy state (NF ) will lead to
ME(NF ,VN) = 1, ME(NF ,VI) = 0 and ME(NF ,VC) = 0.
4.6. Online Locating Accidental Fault
If we choose TS simulation time points for all the M
HMMs, we observe TS · M sequences, with which the most
probable system behaviour can be derived. By computing the
statistic of each state, the state with maximum probability is
located as the fault source. To online locate accidental fault
for time point t, we use the observed sequences in the past
time of t according to the feature of markov process. How-
ever, when t is too long, we might have huge quantity of
observed sequences, which makes the computation time in-
creases. To solve this problem, a sampling window W is in-
troduced to limit the length of t.
Example 4. At time point 5, The observed sequences for 3
variables are:
Seq1 :
(
NF F1 F1 F2 F1
)
Seq2 :
(
F1 F1 F1 F3 F1
)
Seq3 :
(
NF F1 F1 F2 F1
)
The state with maximum probability is F1, which means
component C1 is most probably the fault source.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
5.1. Test Bed
Since it is costly to generate test data for real system,
and it is less convincing by replaying a sample, we design
a specific test bed to evaluate the method’s accuracy and effi-
ciency by generating a large quantity of simulated use cases.
Each use case includes: the system architecture which de-
fines the components and physical variables, and their inter-
connections; the failure probability of each component; the
functional specification corresponding to each physical vari-
able or some group of them; the running time counter after
which the system will stop producing output.
The method assumes that: Each component in the system
has a chance to fail. This probability can be 0; All functional
constraints are based on variable’s value itself, and for sim-
plification, they are all range constraint, which means they
delimit only the min/max value of the variables.
If an accidental fault occurs, the test bed will give out an
out-of-range value for this component’s output. This emulates
how a system falls into fault, whatever the model is.
The test bed will extract its architecture and give each com-
ponent a random low probability of falling into accidental
fault as the prior knowledge of device’s fault parameter.
Each component’s input and output will be allocated to a
variable by the test bed. It guarantees that the interconnected
ones share the same variable. The variable will be associated
with a random range, which is the functional specification. If
a device is more probable to fail, the test-bed-generated value
for its entire output variables will be more probable to go out
of the defined range.
The approach will use the generated data and the functional
specification to locate the most probable component as the
accidental fault source if there is some violation observed.
The test bed will then compare this computed conclusion with
the initial context to deduce whether the method is efficient.
5.2. Experiments
Our test bed has generated 1000 test cases to evaluate the
method’s performance in terms of accuracy. The criterion that
impacts the accuracy is the complexity of system’s architec-
ture. This can be measured by component’s average input &
output number (Fig. 9), and component number. (Fig. 10). We
generate different scale test groups from 1 to 50 inputs/out-
puts or components. Each group has 20 test cases. The test re-
sults show the max/min/average accuracy ratio in each group.
We find out this method is more sensible to the average input
& output number, while more scalable to component number.
This method deals with the accidental fault localization for
middle-range systems with accuracy superior to 95%.
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Figure 9. Accuracy by Input Number
The computation of the HMM parameters by resolving
linear system (the influence layout algorithm) and eventu-
ally optimising non-linear system (the initial matrix with-
out complete prior knowledge) consumes time, ranging from
seconds to several minutes according to the system’s com-
plexity. However, it computes only once before the fault
localization process begins, because the HMM’s initializa-
tion is architecture-dependent-only. Once the HMM is pre-
computed, the fault localization algorithm is very fast and
depends only on the observation sequence length. Since the
Component
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Figure 10. Accuracy by Component Number
sampling window is bounded, this method gives a good re-
sponse to the online accidental fault localization problem.
5.3. Helicopter Control System Case Study
After certifying statistically the method’s performance us-
ing the test bed, we rely on a classical Simulink teaching
model of simple helicopter control system [11] to evaluate,
whether the proposed approach works also well for real sys-
tem. A complete mathematical model, including propeller
dynamics, forces generated by the propellers, static and dy-
namic friction of the bearings, etc. is an overkill for method
proofing objectives, therefore a simplified version is chosen.
This helicopter is a linear 4th order system, where the 6 con-
trol matrices are pre-defined.
In order to introduce the accidental fault into the test, we
modify the Simulink model to have some components gen-
erating faulty outputs at some given time point according to
its original functionality. These components will have a com-
puted failure probability which is based on the ratio between
failure count and total simulation time tick. The total simula-
tion time is 10000, while the sampling window size is 1000.
The fault localization method gives a good accuracy through-
out the test, as shown in Fig. 11: the average accuracy de-
grades with the widening of sampling windows, but once the
sampling window is selected, the accuracy stabilizes and the
total accuracy is superior to 90%.
5.4. Discussion
This method needs less complete specification to derive
fault analysis conclusion, because it uses architecture con-
cept. This is an advantage for analysing old-fashioned sys-
tem, when people focus mainly on conception but not formal
specification.
At the very beginning of this paper, we reasonably assume
there is at most one accidental fault in the whole system at
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Figure 11. Helicopter Control System Case Study Result
time point t. In this situation, the computational complexity is
only O(n), which is scalable. If we consider there might be n
accidental fault at time t, it is O(2n) complicated in space and
time, which makes it difficult to scale for large system with
complex architecture. A compromise can be applied in prac-
tice if we pre-know that at most only K component will en-
counter accidental fault at the same time. Therefore the com-
plexity reduce to O(C(n,1)+C(n,2)+ ...+C(n,k)).
A weak point of this method is the quantification of some
hypothesis based on the influence distribution DI. This is also
why we find in the experiment, when the complexity of sys-
tem architecture increases, the method’s accuracy degrades.
To solve this problem, we should introduce an approach
which makes good compromise between architecture-based
HMM parametrization and observation sampling learning-
based HMM initialization. This is our ongoing work.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel approach to do online analysis
of accidental fault localization in dynamic systems by using
HMM. HMM can be used as an abstraction of real system,
and emulates real system’s behaviour. Inspired by the prin-
ciples of FTA and of maximum entropy in Bayesian proba-
bility theory, we propose the algorithms to estimate HMM’s
parameters, avoiding to pass through learning task, because
the learning data for accidental fault in real system is diffi-
cult to obtain. Once HMM is completed, by observing output
sequence within the sampling window, we can online esti-
mate the source of accidental fault. We design a specific test
bed to generate large quantity of test cases. The experimental
results have assessed the accuracy and efficiency of our ap-
proach. The accuracy of accidental fault localization is supe-
rior to 95% for normal scaled systems. Meanwhile, we apply
the approach to a simple helicopter control system case study,
which shows the accuracy is superior to 90%.
We will improve the concreteness of the influence distri-
bution by introducing heuristic algorithms and experiment
the approach on more complicated use cases in future work.
Meanwhile, we will introduce an approach which makes good
compromise between architecture-based HMM parametriza-
tion and observation sampling learning-based HMM initial-
ization. The later is capable be generalized to more applica-
tions, e.g. for detecting and locating design faults in systems.
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